Institutional Barriers to Diversity in Party Leadership
Evidence from State Legislatures

Eric R. Hansen
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Loyola University Chicago
ehansen4@luc.edu

Christopher J. Clark
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
chriclar@email.unc.edu

The authors thank Adam Hii, Mason Dufresne, Dan Gustafson, David Joyner, Melissa Lee, Amanda Lewellyn, Katie Pischke, and Adam Weber for research assistance.

It is well-known that women, racial/ethnic minorities, and blue-collar workers are underrepresented in American legislatures compared to their proportion in the broader population (Carnes 2013, Casellas 2011, Hero 1998, Swers 2002). Though women and minorities in particular have made gains in office over the last several decades, their presence in leadership positions in legislatures tends to lag behind their representation in rank-and-file membership. To illustrate by surveying only the top leaders in the House and Senate, Nancy Pelosi was the first and only woman to serve as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. By our estimation, no African American, Latino, or blue-collar worker has served as Speaker.[1] No women, African Americans, or Latinos have served as U.S. Senate Majority Leader either, and the last blue-collar worker to serve in the position was Robert Byrd.[2] To be certain, more women, minorities, and workers have served in lower-profile Congressional leadership positions than in the very top positions. However, American legislative scholars rarely ask how members of underrepresented groups move up in the ranks within legislatures (cf. Jewell and Whicker 1994). What explains the lack of diversity in legislative leadership?

In this paper, our primary goal is to examine the role of institutional characteristics in shaping the demographic composition of legislative leadership. The groups we study are African Americans, Latinos, women, and blue-collar workers. We recognize that these groups have distinct histories and experience politics differently in the contemporary era. Yet, a secondary goal in this paper is to explore whether a general theory of how institutions either hinder or help individuals from non-traditional groups advance to leadership can be developed.

[1] Using a slightly different definition of social class based on education instead of occupation, we note that Speaker Jim Wright attended but never graduated college. However, he became a partner in a national trade and advertising firm before running for elected office.

[2] Byrd worked as a gas station attendant and welder before winning his first elected position in the West Virginia House of Representatives.

We expect that the institutions, independent of demographics and attitudes, explain in part the composition of leadership in state legislatures. As opposed to studying the U.S. Congress, a place with less institutional variation, we examine this question in the American states, a place long studied due to differences across institutions. In particular, we assess whether and how the number of leadership positions, selection methods, professionalism, and term limits affect who moves from the rank-and-file to higher internal office.

We examine data from 30 states over the period of 2003 to 2014. Because the number of leadership positions varies widely across states, we define leadership broadly, relying upon state legislatures to define which positions in their own ranks count as leadership positions. Generally speaking, leadership positions include speakers and speakers pro tem in lower chambers, presidents and/or presidents pro tem in upper chambers, and party leaders, whips, party caucus chairs, and floor leaders in all chambers.[3]

We find that women are more likely to advance to leadership when a legislative chamber has more leadership positions available, that African Americans are more likely to advance to leadership through appointment by a chamber's presiding officers, and that Latinos are more likely to advance to leadership when elected by their colleagues. Beyond these particular findings, however, we do not find evidence that institutional design itself creates universal barriers for underrepresented groups to advance to leadership. More consistently, we find that a larger presence for each of the groups within the chamber is positively associated with members of that group advancing to leadership positions. The results point to a pipeline problem, though this explanation does not fully explain the underrepresentation of these groups in leadership even

[3] Because we are more interested in how state legislators choose leaders from within their own ranks, we exclude from our analysis all senate presidents selected by statewide election to the lieutenant governorship.

relative to rank-and-file membership. The findings emphasize the need for more research into how these marginalized group members attain greater power within legislatures.

Diversity in Legislative Leadership

An indicator that political scientists often use to assess the legitimacy of representative bodies is the presence of representatives from politically marginalized groups. In the United States, these groups include women, racial/ethnic minorities, and the working class, given that these groups have traditionally held less political power than their counterpart groups (men, whites, and members of the middle and upper classes). Early in the republic's history, a combination of state and federal laws restricted the right merely to vote, let alone to hold elected office, primarily to white male property owners. Over time, the profile of elected officials has changed. Passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, and its amendments to include language minorities in 1975, directly led to the election of African Americans and Latinos (Lublin 1997). Despite passage of the 19th Amendment in 1920, women did not serve in great numbers in elected office until much later (see CAWP for more information). Instead, party recruitment efforts are critical for whether women serve in office (Fox and Lawless 2004; Sanbonmatsu 2006). Working class Americans are also underrepresented in elected office (Carnes 2013). Party recruitment efforts rarely reach workers, and workers often face economic challenges in fundraising and supporting themselves financially on the campaign trail (Carnes 2018).

The absence of blacks, Latinos, women, and workers from representative bodies has received considerable scholarly attention.[4] This is for good reason because when these groups

[4] Scholars have also studied the presence of other underrepresented groups in legislatures, including racial/ethnic groups like Asian Americans (Phillips 2017) and Native Americans (Wilkins and Stark 2018), as well as LGBT+ citizens (e.g. Haider-Markel 2010). These groups also merit study, but we fear there is too little variation in the representation of these groups, particularly in legislative leadership positions, to allow for quantitative analysis.

are not in office, it speaks volumes about who is fit to serve and reinforces views espoused by some that people of a certain profile—white, male, and middle or upper class—are more suitable to serve in elected office (see Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). Clearly, who has a seat at the table is worthy of scholarly attention, yet it is also critical to consider whether politically marginalized groups are influential within legislative bodies.

Although influence can be measured using membership in a dominant coalition (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984), we examine influence based on the acquisition of leadership positions. Why study legislative leaders? One reason is that these actors have formal powers that allow them to shape politics and policy in their states. House speakers, for instance, have powers to appoint other leaders and committee chairs, allocate legislative resources, and control the agenda on the House floor (Clucas 2001, Kanthak 2009, Mooney 2013, Anzia and Jackman 2013). Lower-level leaders have additional influence: party caucus chairs help set policy goals while whips enforce party discipline. In essence, party leaders run the show—the policies and laws that legislatures create are often a direct result of the efforts that leaders make to organize their own caucus and negotiate with the other party. Consequentially, the inclusion of traditionally marginalized groups with distinct policy preferences into legislative leadership could greatly improve the group's prospects for passing and implementing their own preferred policies.

Legislative leaders hold informal powers as well, with the most notable being in the realm of campaign finance. For example, during his time as Speaker of the House in California, Willie Brown used this "power of the purse" to maintain his party's majority in the state legislature, which in turn allowed him to remain Speaker (Clucas 1995). Over time, state legislative campaigns have more expensive, and while all legislators are required to raise funds,

party leaders and committee chairs are expected to bring in more money (Powell 2012). Legislative leaders also possess other formal powers such as assigning offices, parking spaces, assigning committees, and killing legislation (Boyarsky 2008; Brown 2008). These actors receive greater media attention and have greater name recognition, which can be used to their political advantage (see Donovan et al 2015).

Besides wielding political power, leaders can serve as political leaders of their community in state government and role models within their states. Karen Bass, for example, made history in 2008 by becoming the first African American woman to serve as any state's Speaker of the House, doing so in California. Her intersectional identity allowed her to serve as a role model to African American men, women of all racial backgrounds, and especially for African American women. Other legislative leaders may be less famous than the Speaker, but these individuals should be viewed as role models in the same way given their standing in the legislature.

Studying Leadership Diversity in State Legislatures

We explore whether certain types of legislative institutions allow for greater inclusion of underrepresented groups in legislative leadership. We focus our study of leadership diversity on American state legislatures for two reasons. First, states provide greater variation in the diversity of legislative leaders than Congress does. For example, an examination of gender diversity for Speaker of the U.S. House would be limited to a case study of Nancy Pelosi, whereas in state legislatures, five women are serving as state house speakers in 2018 alone.[5] Second, states provide greater institutional variation than does Congress. Historically, leadership positions in

[5] In our data set, eight unique women served as state house speakers, 11 served as senate presidents, and dozens more served in lower-level leadership positions.

Congress—especially committee chairs—were largely determined on the basis of seniority (Polsby 1968), though some differences existed between Democrats and Republicans concerning adherence to this norm (Nelson 1977; Peabody 1967, 1976). Subsequent changes to House and Senate rules have given party leaders more discretion in promoting leaders, though tenure remains an important factor in promotion. That said, state legislatures have rules governing membership such as term limits that are absent in Congress, not to mention differ in terms of the overall number of leadership positions available. In summary, state legislatures possess the demographic traits and institutional variation that make them an ideal setting for studying leadership diversity.

Legislative Institutions and Leadership Diversity

As an initial look into how institutional design structures who serves in leadership, we examine four institutional variations across states: number of leadership positions, procedures for leadership selection, professionalism, and term limits. We lay out our expectations for each in turn. Because of the limited research on underrepresented groups in legislative leadership, we frequently rely on findings from the promotion of these groups to other political positions—city council members, judges, and political appointees in bureaucratic agencies—to guide our expectations.

Number of Leadership Positions

A greater number of leadership positions should be associated with increased diversity in leadership. City councils that are larger have more black, Latino, and women members (Alozie and Manganaro 1993a, 1993b). More judges who are racial and ethnic minorities and women serve in states where more judicial positions are available (Bratton and Spill 2002; Hurwitz and

Lanier 2003). One explanation for these findings is the prestige theory, or the idea that when more positions are available that an office becomes less desirable to white males, making it easier for underrepresented groups to attain them.[6] Another take on these findings is that when more positions are available that greater opportunities exist for legislators from traditionally underrepresented groups to serve in office (Jewell and Whicker 1994). Moreover, coordinated efforts within a chamber to prevent any member of a faction from assuming a leadership position would be more difficult to sustain as the number of positions grows.

For our purposes, it is inconsequential whether greater diversity arises because these positions are less desirable to traditional office holders, because there are more opportunities for underrepresented groups to serve, or because it is more difficult to prevent certain groups from attaining positions of power. Regardless of the mechanism(s) at work, we expect that states with a greater number of leadership positions will have greater diversity in leadership. We formally state this expectation as follows:

Hypothesis 1: A larger number of leadership positions is associated with increased leadership diversity.

Leadership Selection Methods

Another institutional trait we consider is the selection method for leadership posts. We expect that leadership diversity should be greater when leaders are appointed. For electoral reasons, leaders may want to appease different aspects of the constituency by selecting an underrepresented person to serve in a position of power. One might imagine instances where Democratic Party leadership in a state chooses to appoint African Americans to leadership

[6] For more information on this theory see Taebel (1978), Welch and Karnig (1979), and Karnig and Welch (1979).

positions as a way to reward the racial group for helping the party win various elections, both district and statewide. Moreover, given what we know about voting behavior of the masses, we expect elections to lead to less diversity in legislative leadership. Due to racially polarized voting, it is difficult for blacks and Latinos to win elections in jurisdictions that are majority white (Casellas 2011, Clark n.d., Engstrom 1989, Lublin 1997). No legislative chamber is majority white, suggesting it will be difficult for blacks and Latinos to attain leadership positions via election from their peers. A similar logic applies to women and workers. Leaders may want to appoint these individuals to positions of power, but these underrepresented groups may have a challenging time attaining leadership positions via elections given their seat share in chambers.[7]

Turning to other examples of political leaders, more black judges, both male and female, are selected via appointment (Martin and Pyle 2002), although Alozie (1988) suggests that judicial selection method does not influence the presence of black judges. A greater number of white women judges serve when judges are elected via nonpartisan elections (Martin and Pyle 2002), and others suggest that women are appointed to serve as judges so long as there is not already another woman serving in that capacity (Bratton and Spill 2002). Hurwitz and Lanier (2003) argue that more women and racial and ethnic minorities serve in office when two things are true: elites play a role in the nominating process, and these elite actors are liberal. All told, findings are mixed concerning whether judicial diversity is better served by elections or appointments.

A handful of studies have examined how selection method affects leadership diversity in state legislatures. In a case study of Willie Brown, Clucas (1995) explains how Brown became the first African American Speaker of the House in California by winning the support of both

[7] We are aware that women hold a far greater seat share than any of the groups studied, and that in recent memory they held a majority of seats in a chamber. See Schilling's paper for this conference for more information.

Democrats and Republicans.[8] Other accounts of legislative diversity examine multiple states and tend to focus more on how institutions affect leadership diversity in legislatures. Darcy (1996) shows that selection method does not affect whether women serve as committee chair, but that women tend to lead committees that have jurisdiction over matters such as education, health, and social and human services. This pattern suggests that women are likelier to chair committees that concern traditional women's issues (see Osborn 2012). Orey, Overby, and Larimer (2007) find little evidence selection method affects whether blacks serve as committee chair.

To state our expectation for legislative leaders formally:

Hypothesis 2: Election of leaders is associated with decreased leadership diversity.

Legislative Professionalism

Studies consider how legislative professionalism affects the descriptive representation of African Americans, blue-collar workers, Latinos, and women. Casellas (2011) provides strong evidence that fewer Latinos serve in states with professionalized legislatures, arguing that as political newcomers it is difficult for the group to win elected office in such settings. For women, findings are mixed, with some studies finding that professionalized legislatures depress the number of women (Diamond 1977; Hogan 2001; Squire 1992), while others find this institutional trait to matter little for whether women serve in the state legislature (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Hill 1981). More African Americans serve in states with professionalized legislatures (Clark n.d.; Squire 1992), but professional legislatures tend to attract members who have traditional economic advantages to serving in office, thereby depressing the number of blue collar workers (Carnes and Hansen 2016).

[8] In fact, Brown won more Republican votes than Democratic votes (28 vs. 23)

Legislative professionalism affects the composition of legislatures beyond the diverse groups studied here. The more professionalized the legislature, the fewer homemakers, students, business employees, and retired persons serve as state legislators (Squire 1992), pointing to less occupational diversity in professionalized legislatures. Professionalized legislatures experience less turnover (Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004), especially helping incumbent legislators remain in office (Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000). As a result, professionalized legislatures should have more stable membership than less professionalized legislatures.

When it comes to leadership selection, states with professionalized legislatures have more established patterns of succession (Chaffey and Jewell 1972). A reliance on succession should decrease diversity in legislative leadership because the people in line to attain power are likely white, male, and white-collar. Jewell and Whicker (1994) find that legislative professionalism's impact on women serving in leadership is mixed. On the one hand, such bodies encourage continuity in leadership and thereby depress the number of women who serve in leadership. On the other hand, such bodies are inclined to elect leaders whose styles are based on building consensus, which is truer of women than of men.

For our purposes, we expect lower legislative diversity in states with professionalized legislatures. Not only do professionalized legislatures have more stable membership, but these places should also encourage continuity in leadership. Together, these two traits ought to make it so that white men who are middle class (or higher) hold a greater number of leadership positions.

Hypothesis 3: Legislative professionalism is associated with decreased leadership diversity.

Term Limits

Currently, fifteen states force legislators to retire after one to three terms in office, depending on state law, and evidence is mixed concerning how term limits affect the demographic composition of legislatures. On the one hand, studies show that term limited states have more state legislators who are Latino (Casellas 2011), black (Carroll and Jenkins 2005), and female (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Thompson and Moncrief 1993). An explanation for these findings is that term limits remove incumbents from office, and once these seats are open it becomes easier underrepresented groups to win elected office. On the other hand, term limits are found to have no appreciable impact on whether women or racial and ethnic minorities serve in state legislatures (Caress et al 2003; Carey et al 2006; Carroll and Jenkins 2001; Schraufnagel and Halperin 2006). These studies provide different explanations for why term limits fail to increase the number of state legislators who are women and racial and ethnic minorities, but what can be gleaned from these studies is that the presence of an institutional trait alone does not engender increased descriptive representation of underrepresented groups.

Few studies consider how term limits affect leadership diversity in state legislatures. Orey, Overby, and Larimer (2007) find that term limited states have fewer black committee chairs in 1999, but term limits are unrelated to whether blacks serve as committee chairs in 1989. Jewell and Whicker (1994) argue that term limits should increase the number of women in leadership. The logic is that term limits induce turnover, which provides women a greater opportunity to attain positions of power.

We expect term limits to increase leadership diversity in state legislatures. Our expectation is primarily due to how term limits affect stability in membership, which in turn affects continuity in leadership. Term-limited states have greater turnover in membership

(Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004). By diminishing long-term seniority (i.e. decades of service) as a requirement for obtaining a leadership position, term limits may allow more traditionally underrepresented groups to serve in leadership by lowering the necessary time spent in office to rise in the ranks. Ultimately, term limits are an institutional trait that provides an easier path for non-traditional leaders to emerge. To state our expectation formally:

Hypothesis 4: Legislative term limits are associated with increased leadership diversity.

Data

To test the above hypotheses, we rely upon original data describing the gender, race, ethnicity, and previous occupation(s) of legislators in 30 states.[9] We gathered these data from state legislative websites, manuals, blue books, and other official state data sources. Our data cover six legislative terms beginning with 2003-04 and continuing to 2013-14.[10] These years represent the period of time that allowed us to maximize the number of states included in our data—state records become increasingly spotty prior to 2003. The remaining states for which we did not collect data either do not collect and publish such data or did not make the data available for the time period of interest.[11]

We also relied upon the same sources to gather lists of state legislative leaders over the period of observation. As mentioned previously, we do not limit leadership to a specific set of positions, in part because we consider the variation in the number of leadership positions in

[9] The 30 observed states are AK, AZ, CA, CO, CT, FL, GA, IA, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, MA, MD, MI, MN, NC, NE, NJ, NY, NV, OK, PA, SC, TN, TX, WI, and WY. Though we do not claim this set is perfectly representative of all states, we can detect no glaring differences between these states and the remaining 20 in terms of relevant variables like population, region, party control of government, or social diversity.

[10] For states where legislative terms begin in even years instead of odd—in our data, only New Jersey fits this description—we matched each even-year term to the odd-year term beginning immediately afterwards (i.e. New Jersey's 2002-03 term is observed as 2003-04).

[11] Of the 354 chamber-term observations in the scope of our data collection effort, we are able to use 324 observations that have no missing data.

creating opportunities for underrepresented groups interesting to study in its own right. Rather, we rely upon state sources to define which positions count as leadership positions. The non-partisan Nebraska Unicameral Legislature has only one leadership position, the Speaker, whose primary role is to set the agenda for floor votes. On the other end of the spectrum, the Connecticut House places dozens of its members in leadership positions. In the 2009-10 term, 72 members of the Connecticut House served in leadership positions, often with multiple members holding titles like Assistant Minority Leader or Deputy Majority Whip. We do not include committee chairs among leadership positions.[12]

Our unit of analysis is the state legislative chamber. Using chambers, rather than states, allows us a larger number of observations and greater variation to leverage in our analysis. While two of our institutional characteristics of interest—professionalism and term limits—vary at the state level, the other two—number of leadership positions and selection methods—vary at the chamber level.

To create our dependent variables, we matched our legislative leaders to our data describing the race, gender, and occupation of rank-and-file legislators. We calculated the variables *Percent Women Leaders*, *Percent Black Leaders*, *Percent Latino Leaders*, and *Percent Worker Leaders* simply by dividing the number of leaders in each group over the total number of leadership positions in the chamber. We note that because we are interested primarily in the role that universal legislative rules and institutional characteristics play in determining our outcome

[12] Committee chairs are influential in policymaking and are often prominent political leaders within chambers by virtue of their positions. However, we consider their responsibilities—considering and marking up legislation within specific policy areas—sufficiently different from the responsibilities of legislative leaders—moving legislation forward on the floor and enforcing party discipline—to merit separate analyses.

variables, our measure combines all leaders serving in both majority and minority party leadership positions.[13]

We study the impact of four different institutional characteristics in allowing members of underrepresented groups to serve in leadership positions. The first characteristic, *Number of Leadership Positions*, is calculated from the data collection described above. In keeping with Hypothesis 1, we expect that the number of leadership positions will be positively associated with greater diversity in legislative leadership.

Figure 1 plots the percent of leaders from each group against the number of positions. The x axis in each panel of the plot shows a count of the leadership positions in each chamber, while the y axis displays the percent of leaders from each group. The data displayed are only for the 2013-14 terms, but the patterns within groups do not vary substantially from term to term. The figure shows that a greater number of leadership positions is positively related to greater representation of women and African Americans in leadership. However in both cases, the estimates are not statistically significant. We find no evidence that a greater number of positions allows for more Latinos or workers to serve in office.

The second characteristic captures the selection method for leaders in each chamber. All state house speakers and all senate presidents (or presidents pro tem, in states where lieutenant governors serve as senate presidents) are elected by membership. However, state chamber rules differ on whether the remaining leadership positions are elected by membership or appointed by the chamber's presiding officer. Data describing selection methods come from the *Book of the*

[13] Some readers might worry that including both majority and minority leadership positions in the measure fails to account for the disproportionate affiliation of representatives of these underrepresented groups with the Democratic Party. However, the data tell a more bipartisan story. While it is true that the large majority of black leaders in our data are Democrats, many women, Latinos, and workers serve as Republican leaders. Nonetheless, we account for party control of chambers in our multivariate analyses below.

Figure 1: Do More Leadership Positions Create More Opportunities for Underrepresented Group Members to Become Leaders?



Source: Authors' data collection. Data shown are for the 2013-2014 term only.

States, published annually by the Council of State Governments. In order to simplify the process for quantitative analysis, we created a binary variable with values of 1 indicating states where non-presiding officers are elected and 0 indicating chambers where non-presiding officers are

Figure 2: Does Appointment or Election Allow More Underrepresented Group Members to Serve in Leadership?



Source: Authors' data collection and the *Book of the States*.

appointed.[14] We expect that leadership elections will be associated with a more diverse legislative leadership.

Figure 2 plots the percent of leaders from each group against selection method for leadership. The x axis in each panel displays whether state legislative membership elects most of its leaders or whether leaders are appointed by the chamber's presiding officer. The y axis again

[14] Rules are remarkably consistent across positions within chambers—in the vast majority of states in our sample, either all/almost all leaders are elected or all/almost all leaders are appointed. In the few states where leaders come to power through a mix of procedures, we coded chambers based on how a majority of leaders obtain their positions.

shows the percent of leaders from each group. Each bar represents the average percent of leadership from each group under the selection method. Figure 2 shows that women and black leaders are more likely to be appointed than elected. Though the means are not significantly different for women leaders, the difference of means is both statistically significant and substantively large for African Americans. On average, about 5% of leaders in chambers with leadership elections are black, compared with about 15% of leaders in chambers where leaders are appointed—a 10 percentage point increase over chambers with elections. On the other hand, Latinos and workers appear more likely to be elected to their positions than appointed, though the differences between the selection methods are not statistically significant.

The third institutional characteristic, *Legislative Professionalism*, is gathered from estimates created by Bowen and Greene (2014). We expect that greater professionalism will be associated with a less diverse legislative leadership. Figure 3 plots the percent of leaders from each group against legislative professionalism. The x axis in each panel displays the professionalism of the legislature, with higher values indicating more professional legislatures. The y axis, as before, shows the percent of leaders from each group. The results generally indicate that professionalism does not play a large role in either allowing or hindering a greater presence of underrepresented groups in leadership. There appears to be no relationship between professionalism and the presence of women, African Americans, Latinos, or workers in leadership.

The final institutional characteristic, *Term Limits*, is gathered from the National Conference of State Legislatures. Because term limits for some state-terms in our data were later overturned by judicial challenges, we observe values of 1 for this variable if term limits were

Figure 3: Do Underrepresented Group Members Hold More Leadership Positions in Professional Legislatures?



Source: Authors' data collection, Bowen and Greene (2014)

implemented in the term of observation and 0 if they were not. We expect that term limits will be associated with a more diverse legislative leadership.

Figure 4 plots the percent of leaders from each group against term limits. The x axis indicates whether the state implements term limits, while the y axis indicates the percent of leaders from each group. Each bar represents the average percent of leadership from each group in chambers with limits imposed or not imposed. Term limits appear to make the presence of women or African Americans in leadership positions slightly less likely, but the differences are

Figure 4: Do Term Limits Allow More Underrepresented Group Members to Serve in Leadership?



Source: Authors' data collections, NCSL.

not statistically significant. However, term limits appear to make a large difference for Latinos in leadership. About 2% of leaders in states without term limits are Latino, compared with 7% of leaders in states with term limits. We note that a large proportion of the Latino leaders in term limited states come from just two states, California and Florida. Both states have a large presence of Latinos in the state population and rank-and-file membership, leading us to be suspicious of a spurious relationship between term limits and Latino presence in leadership (more rigorous testing below confirms that suspicion). Finally, workers are less likely to hold leadership positions in term limited state legislatures, but the difference is not statistically significant.

Determining whether the relationships found in the figures above persist while accounting for possible confounding factors provides the basis for our analysis in the next section.

Multivariate Tests

Institutional characteristics are not the only factors that affect whether legislative leaders are diverse. We can gain greater leverage in understanding what shapes the composition of legislative leadership by testing the institutional characteristics against each other and against potentially confounding factors, like the composition of rank-and-file membership and partisan control.

Modelling our data poses somewhat of a challenge. Our data are time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) by term and observed in chambers nested within states. Moreover, we observe multiple dependent variables with potentially correlated error terms. Model selection for these data involves tradeoffs where our data will likely violate assumptions of the model no matter which modelling framework we choose. In response, we estimate models using multiple statistical methods. However, the results we draw across models are largely similar, suggesting that the conclusions we draw are not dependent on any one modelling choice.

We proceed by presenting and interpreting results from a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model, but supplementary analyses using other methods are presented in the appendix and referred to in the text below. SUR allows us to model several related outcome variables simultaneously, which better accounts for contemporaneous correlation between the error terms than if the models were estimated separately. For the purposes of this model, we pool all observations and include fixed effects for each term. (This approach ignores the hierarchical structure of our data—observations of chambers nested within states and clustered within states over time—but we later find similar results when using a multilevel modelling framework.)

We also control for a series of potentially confounding factors. First, we control for presence of each group among the rank-and-file members of each chamber. Jewell and Whicker (1994) argue that more women should serve in leadership in places where more women serve, and Orey, Overby, and Larimer (2007) make a similar argument about blacks serving in leadership positions. In short, the greater the seat share held by diverse members, the likelier legislative leaders should come from these groups. Not only are group members needed to occupy these positions of leadership, but also the more direct power they have through their seat share, the more influential/effective they can be in attaining leadership positions (cf. Kanthak and Krause 2012).

Second, we control for which party holds the majority in each chamber. Our outcome variables measure the presence of underrepresented groups in leadership in both majority and minority parties. Majority parties hold at least as many, and sometimes more, leadership positions than minority parties across states in our measure. If parties are unbalanced in the degree to which they incorporate underrepresented groups into their respective leadership teams, then accounting for which party holds more leadership positions should in part account for the cross-state variation in leadership diversity that is attributable to the composition of party coalitions. We include a binary variable with values of 1 indicating a Democratic majority in the chamber-term. We expect that states with a Democratic majority will have more leadership diversity due to each group studied having stronger ties to the Democratic Party in the era studied.[15]

[15] We recognize that of the four groups, women arguably have the weakest association with the Democratic Party, and that this is especially true of women in the 1970s. However, in the era studied, more women state legislators identify with the Democratic Party than with the Republican Party. In fact, looking at biennial data from 2004 to 2014, we found that on average, 64.4 percent of women state legislators were Democrats, while only 34.9 percent were Republicans (see CAWP for more information).

Finally, we control for the political environment in Southern states. Jewell and Whicker (1994) point out that in many southern states that leadership continues to be all male. Orey, Overby, and Larimer (2007) find that the presence of black committee chairs differs in the South compared to the remainder of the country. One potential explanation for this trend is that southern states also have a traditionalistic political culture (Elazar 1984), places that adhere to traditional gender roles, racial hierarchies, and the notion that politics is a realm where the elite should rule. In other words, in such places, white men who are wealthy are the ones who belong not only in politics, but by extension in positons of leadership.[16]

The results of our seemingly unrelated regression model are presented in Table 1. Our first hypothesis states that the number of leadership positions should be positively related with leadership diversity, controlling for other variables in the model. The results show that the number of positions is positively and significantly related to the percent of women and Latinos in leadership. However, the relationship is substantively small. The coefficient estimates indicate that for each additional leadership position, the percent of women rises 0.26 percentage points and the percent of Latinos rises 0.13 percentage points. The number of positions seems to have no appreciable relationship with the percent of African Americans or workers in office. Overall, we find partial support for our first hypothesis.

The second hypothesis states that elections should be negatively associated with leadership diversity. Contrary to expectations, the results suggest that the use of elections to select leadership are positively and significantly related to the percent of Latinos in office. On average, chambers with elections see a roughly 5 percentage point increase in Latinos in leadership position compared to chambers that appoint leaders. The results also suggest that

[16] Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table A1 in the appendix.

Table 1: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model

	Pct. Women	Pct. Blacks	Pct. Latinos	Pct. Workers
Number of	0.26*	0.00	0.13*	0.02
Positions	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Leadership	3.77	-5.80*	5.11*	-0.48
Elections	(2.55)	(1.18)	(1.46)	(0.86)
Legislative	11.75	-0.95	-6.94	0.41
Professionalism	(9.51)	(4.40)	(5.45)	(3.22)
Term Limits	-2.97	1.23	-1.18	-0.03
	(2.51)	(1.16)	(1.44)	(0.05)
Pct. Women in	1.07*	0.26*	-0.15	-0.04
Legislature	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.05)
Pct. Black in	-0.03	0.72*	0.05	-0.09
Legislature	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.07)
Pct. Latino in	-0.12	-0.02	1.40*	-0.06
Legislature	(0.23)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Pct. Worker in	-0.02	0.04	-0.00	0.50*
Legislature	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.08)
Democratic	-2.80	-0.94	-0.51	-0.77
Control	(2.14)	(0.99)	(1.23)	(0.72)
South	2.98	3.08	-1.67	-0.80
	(3.56)	(1.65)	(2.04)	(1.20)
Term FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-9.99	0.36	-0.87	3.34
	(5.41)	(2.51)	(3.10)	(1.83)
N	324	324	324	324
R^2	0.18	0.48	0.37	0.19

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05.

elections also help women obtain leadership positions, though the relationship is not statistically significant. As expected, the results indicate that leadership elections are negatively and significantly related to the selection of black lawmakers to leadership positions. Chambers with elections see a roughly 6 percentage point decrease in African Americans in leadership positions on average, compared to chambers where leaders are appointed. The results also suggest that leadership elections result in fewer workers in leadership positions, but as for women, this relationship is not statistically significant. Overall, we find mixed support for our second hypothesis.

Our third hypothesis states that legislative professionalism should be negatively related to leadership diversity while our fourth hypothesis states that term limits should be positively related to leadership diversity. In both cases, we find no support for the hypotheses. Neither variable is significantly related to the presence of any of the four groups in office.

The relationship between legislative professionalism and leadership powers might explain our findings. Richman (2010) finds that state house speakers are less powerful in more professionalized legislatures. His explanation is that when individual legislators have greater resources that they are able to achieve their political goals without the help of leaders, and thus have less incentive to provide legislative leaders with greater political power. This trend suggests that in professionalized legislatures that leadership positions may generally be less powerful and thus less desirable. Consistent with prestige theory it means that these positions may be more available to women, blacks, Latinos, and blue-collar workers. In other words, professionalism may both encourage continuity in leadership *and* make positions more available to underrepresented, explaining our null finding.

As for the null findings for term limits, one explanation lies in what studies find when examining how this trait affects the demographic makeup of legislatures. As mentioned earlier, many studies find that term limits in and of themselves matter little for electing more women and racial and ethnic minorities to office. With this in mind, it may be that term limits work in conjunction with other variables, such as seat share, to affect leadership diversity. All told, it is clear that term limits alone are unimportant for understanding whether African Americans, Latinos, women, and blue-collar workers serve in leadership.

Surveying the control variables, a greater presence of each group in rank-and-file membership is positively related with a greater presence of that group in leadership, in line with expectations. Of note, the percent of women in a legislature is also positively and significantly related to the percent of blacks in leadership. Although we did not expect this relationship, this finding could be explained by the kinship that exists between women and African American state legislators. Bratton and Haynie (1999) find that women introduce black interests bills and when motivating this expectation they write, "Because both groups have a history of political, social, and economic discrimination, and because both groups share a relatively recent entry into state legislatures, each group may be sympathetic to issues salient to the other" (661). Bratton and Haynie's research suggests that women legislators may advocate for African Americans to serve in positions of power in the same way that they agenda-set for black interests. Intersectionality may provide another explanation. A large proportion of black legislators are female, so it may be that these black women are advocating for African Americans to attain leadership positions in state legislatures. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but is one worth exploring in the future. Neither of the remaining two control variables (Democratic control or South) are significantly related to any of the outcome variables.

Robustness Checks

To test the hypotheses more rigorously, we also replicate Table 1 in Table A2 of the appendix using seemingly unrelated regression but replacing the control variables with state fixed effects. The results from this specification by and large track the results above, though the fixed effects models tend to indicate larger substantive effects of institutional variables on the outcomes. However in contrast with Table 1, the fixed effects model also shows that leadership elections are positively and significantly related to the percentage of women in office, though we should note that this is the only specification that produces this result.

Neither of these models takes into account the hierarchical structure of the data, with our observations of chambers nested within states. To allow for partial pooling of the data, we estimate a varying-intercepts multilevel model. We include fixed effects for terms and calculate robust clustered standard errors. The results are presented in Table A3 in the appendix. Again, we find that the number of positions is positively and significantly related to the presence of women and Latinos in leadership. The estimates for the association of the elections variable with women, blacks, and Latinos are signed consistently with the previous models, though the estimates fall short of statistical significance in this specification. Legislative professionalism and term limits continue to have no significant association with any of the outcome variables.[17]

We summarize the results from the bivariate tests and multivariate statistical models only by focusing on the patterns we see emerge most consistently across specifications. First, nearly all models pointed toward the conclusion that women are more likely to gain leadership positions when there are more positions available. (We find mixed evidence that more positions enable greater service in leadership among Latinos.) Second, nearly all models provided evidence that

[17] We also estimate four separate OLS regression models as a final robustness check and present the results in Table A4 of the appendix. The results largely fall in line with the previous results.

elections cost African Americans leadership positions. Third, nearly all models indicated that elections help Latinos obtain more leadership positions. (We find mixed evidence that elections help women into leadership.) We obtain consistent null findings for the relationship between professionalism and leadership diversity and between term limits and leadership diversity. We also do not find that any institutional factors are related to the presence of workers in leadership.

Conclusion

The findings above lead us to draw two broad observations. First, institutional characteristics do not seem to be strongly associated with the advancement of underrepresented groups to leadership positions. Second, those characteristics that are related to an increased or decreased presence of underrepresented groups in leadership are not universal or systematic. That is, institutions that seem to advance or hinder one type of underrepresented group do not necessarily have the same effects for other groups.

Our findings do suggest that certain legislative institutions do create greater leadership opportunities for specific groups—for instance, more positions help women obtain higher office and leadership appointments help African Americans do the same. Our findings also point to the importance of a pipeline of underrepresented group members from the rank-and-file to leadership. When more members of an underrepresented group are present in a legislature, more members also tend to be present in leadership. This finding may seem self-evident at one level, but it also suggests that neither pure tokenism—advancement to leadership without a noticeable group presence in the body—nor a backlash effect—a declining presence in leadership as rank-and-file membership grows—explains the presence (or absence) of women, minorities, and workers in higher offices.

A secondary purpose of this research was to explore whether a generalized theory of minority promotion to leadership could be developed and applied to multiple groups. While we cannot definitively answer that question with one peculiar study, the evidence from this endeavor points toward the conclusion that a general theory of minority promotion will obscure crucial differences in the processes by which underrepresented groups gain political power. It may be difficult for researchers to make claims that a general theory developed and tested using data from one group can be applied to other groups without providing concrete evidence.

A question that this research does not answer is what difference the presence of underrepresented groups in leadership make, whether to the operation and procedures of the legislatures, the policies it passes, or its responsiveness to citizens. The current project is an attempt to map out minority representation in leadership and explore the relationship between institutional characteristics. The presence of traditionally marginalized groups in leadership certainly has symbolic importance—it speaks to questions of who is fit for office and who is capable of political leadership. But the full implications of presence in leadership remains to be seen. Writing more than two decades ago, Jewell and Whicker (1994) found that women leaders ran their chambers in a more consensus-based rather than a commanding style. More research is needed to examine the impact that leadership from marginalized groups makes.

References

Alozie, Nicholas O., and Lynne Manganaro. 1993a. “Women’s Council Representation: Measurement Implications for Public Policy.” *Political Research Quarterly* 46(2): 383-398.

------. 1993b. “Black and Hispanic Council Representation: Does Council Size Matter? *Urban Affairs Review* 29(2): 276-298.

Anzia, Sarah F., and Molly C. Jackman. 2013. “Legislative Organization and the Second Face of Power: Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures.” *Journal of Politics* 75(1): 210-24.

Berry, William D., Michael B. Berkman, and Stuart Schneiderman. 2000. “Legislative Professionalism and Incumbent Reelection: The Development of Institutional Boundaries.” *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 859-874.

Boyarsky, Bill. 2008. *Big Daddy: Jesse Unruh and the Art of Power Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bratton, Kathleen A., and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. “Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race.” *Journal of Politics* 61(3): 658-679.

Bratton, Kathleen A., and Rorie L. Spill. 2002. “Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role of the Appointment Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme Courts.” *Social Science Quarterly* 83(2): 504-518.

Brown, Willie. 2008. *Basic Brown: My Life and Our Times*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Carey, John M., Richard G. Niemi, Lynda W. Powell, and Gary F. Moncrief. 2006. “The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(1): 105-134.

Carnes, Nicholas. 2013. *White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policymaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Carnes, Nicholas, and Eric R. Hansen. 2016. “Does Paying Politicians More Promote Economic Diversity in Legislatures?” *American Political Science Review* 110(4): 699-716.

Carnes, Nicholas. 2018. *The Cash Ceiling: Why Only the Rich Run for Office—and What We Can Do About It*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Carroll, Susan J., and Krista Jenkins. 2001. “Do Term Limits Help Women Get Elected?” *Social Science Quarterly* 82(1): 197-201.

------. 2005. “Increasing Diversity or More of the Same? Term Limits and the Representation of Women, Minorities, and Minority Women in State Legislatures.” *National Political Science Review* 10: 71-84.

Caress, Stanley M., Charles Elder, Richard Elling, Jean-Phillipe Faletta, Shannon K. Orr, Eric Rader, …Lyke Thompson. 2003. "Effect of Term Limits on the Election of Minority State Legislators." *State and Local Government Review* 35(3): 183-195.

Casellas, Jason P. 2011. *Latino Representation in State Houses and Congress*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Center for American Women in Politics. 2018. "Women in State Legislatures, 1975-2016." Retrieved from http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/facts/levels_of_office/state_legislature

Chaffey, Douglas Camp, and Malcolm E. Jewell. 1972. "Selection and Tenure of State Legislative Party Leaders: A Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Politics* 34(4): 1278-1286.

Clark, Christopher J. n.d. *Gaining Voice: Causes and Consequences of Black Representation in the American States.*

Clucas, Richard A. 1995. *The Speaker's Electoral Connection: Willie Brown and the California Assembly*. Berkeley: IGS Press.

Clucas, Richard A. 2001. "Principal-Agent Theory and the Power of State House Speakers." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26(2): 319-338.

Darcy, R. 1996. "Women in the State Legislative Power Structure: Committee Chairs." *Social Science Quarterly* 77(4): 888-898.

Darcy, R, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark. 1994. *Women, Elections, and Representation* (Second Edition). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Diamond, Irene. 1977. *Sex Roles in the State House*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Donovan, Todd, Daniel A. Smith, Tracy Osborn, and Christopher Z. Mooney. 2015. *State and Local Politics: Institutions and Reform* (Fourth Edition). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning.

Elazar, Daniel J. 1984. *American Federalism: A View from the States* (Third Edition). New York: Harper and Row.

Engstrom, Richard L. 1989. "When Blacks Run for Judge: Racial Divisions in the Candidate Preferences of Louisiana Voters." *Judicature* 73(2): 87-89.

Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2004. "Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for Office." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 264-280.

Hero, Rodney E. 1998. *Faces of Inequality: Social Diversity in American Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hill, David B. 1981. “Political Culture and Female Political Representation.” *Journal of Politics* 43(1): 159-168.

Hogan, Robert E. 2001. “The Influence of State and District Conditions on the Representation of Women in U.S. State Legislatures.” *American Politics Research* 29(1): 4-24.

Hurwitz, Mark S., and Drew Noble Lanier. 2003. “Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differential Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate Courts.” *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 3(4): 329-352.

Jewell, Malcolm, and Marcia Lynn Whicker. 1994. *Legislative Leadership in the American States.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kanthak, Kristin. 2009. “U.S. State Legislative Committee Assignments and Encouragement of Party Loyalty: An Exploratory Analysis.” *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 9(3): 284-303.

Kanthak, Kristin, and George A. Krause. 2012. *The Diversity Paradox: Political Parties, Legislatures, and the Organizational Foundations of Representation in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Karnig, Albert K., and Susan Welch. 1979. “Sex and Ethnic Differences in Municipal Representation.” *Social Science Quarterly* 60(3): 465-481.

Lublin, David. 1997. *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. “Should Blacks Represent Black and Women Represent Women? A Contingent ‘Yes’.” *Journal of Politics* 61(3): 628-657.

Martin, Elaine, and Barry Pyle. 2002. “Gender and Racial Diversification of State Supreme Courts.” *Women and Politics* 24(2): 35-52.

Moncrief, Gary F., Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda W. Powell. 2004. “Time, Term Limits, and Turnover: Trends in Membership Stability in U.S. State Legislatures.” 29(3): 357-381.

Mooney, Christopher Z. 2013. “Measuring State House Speakers’ Formal Powers, 1981-2010.” *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 13(2): 262-273.

Nelson, Garrison. 1977. “Partisan Patterns of House Leadership Change, 1789-1977.” *American Political Science Review* 71(3): 918-939.

Osborn, Tracy L. 2012. *How Women Represent Women: Political Parties, Gender, and Representation in State Legislatures*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Peabody, Robert L. 1967. “Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives.” *American Political Science Review* 61(3): 675-693.

Peabody, Robert L. 1976. *Leadership in Congress: Stability, Succession, and Change*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Phillips, Anne. 1995. *The Politics of Presence*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Phillips, Christian Dyogi. 2017. *Expansion and Exclusion: Race, Gender, and Immigration in American Politics* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA.

Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 62(1): 144-168.

Powell, Lynda. 2012. *The Influence of Campaign Contributions in State Legislatures: The Effects of Institutions and Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Richman, Jesse. 2010. "The Logic of Legislative Leadership: Preferences, Challenges, and the Speaker's Powers." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 35(2): 211-233.

Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2006. *Where Women Run: Gender and Party in the American States*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Schraufnagel, Scot, and Karen Halperin. 2006. "Term Limits, Electoral Competition, and Representational Diversity: The Case of Florida." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 6(4): 448-62.

Squire, Peverill. 1992. "Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17(1): 69-79.

Swers, Michelle. 2002. *The Difference Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Taebel, Delbert. 1978. "Minority Representation on City Councils." *Social Science Quarterly* 59(1): 142-152.

Thompson, Joel A., and Gary F. Moncrief. 1993. "The Implications of Term Limits for Women and Minorities: Some Evidence from the States." *Social Science Quarterly* 74(2): 300-309.

Welch, Susan, and Albert K. Karnig. 1979. "Correlates of Female Office Holding in City Politics." *Journal of Politics* 41(2): 478-491.

Wilkins, David E., and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark. 2018. *American Indian Politics and the American Political System* (Fourth Edition). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Table A1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev	Min.	Max.
Pct. Women Leaders	22.24	17.44	0	100
Pct. Black Leaders	8.10	10.14	0	50
Pct. Latino Leaders	3.49	11.39	0	100
Pct. Worker Leaders	2.74	5.93	0	33.33
Number of Positions	13.99	11.09	1	72
Leadership Elections	0.74	--	0	1
Legislative Professionalism	0.21	0.12	0.05	0.63
Term Limits	0.20	--	0	1
Pct. Women in Legislature	23.41	6.92	8.2	41.0
Pct. Black in Legislature	8.53	7.05	0	25
Pct. Latino in Legislature	4.10	5.72	0	24.17
Pct. Worker in Legislature	2.46	3.98	0	25
Democratic Control	0.42	--	0	1
South	0.21	--	0	1

Table A2: Replication of Table 1 Using State Fixed Effects

	Pct. Women	Pct. Blacks	Pct. Latinos	Pct. Workers
Number of	0.42*	-0.05	0.24*	0.03
Positions	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.05)
Leadership	15.81*	-12.44*	27.93*	-0.01
Elections	(5.88)	(2.66)	(3.63)	(2.02)
Legislative	-2.43	13.06	3.00	-7.09
Professionalism	(25.82)	(11.69)	(15.95)	(8.87)
Term Limits	-5.39	-0.34	3.40	-0.91
	(5.15)	(2.33)	(3.18)	(1.77)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.37	9.26*	-27.84*	11.03*
	(9.42)	(4.27)	(5.82)	(3.24)
N	324	324	324	324
R^2	0.38	0.62	0.45	0.37

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05.

Table A3: Multilevel Models for Dependent Variables

	Pct. Women	Pct. Blacks	Pct. Latinos	Pct. Workers
Number of	0.38*	-0.03	0.16*	0.27
Positions	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Leadership	6.37	-10.67	13.15	0.68
Elections	(4.93)	(5.89)	(9.70)	(0.89)
Legislative	8.07	5.70	13.16	-0.72
Professionalism	(14.78)	(6.85)	(8.84)	(4.56)
Term Limits	-2.47	-0.11	3.92	-0.66
	(4.57)	(1.53)	(3.09)	(0.94)
State RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	10.82	14.61*	-10.52	2.36
	(6.73)	(6.21)	(6.73)	(0.77)
N	324	324	324	324
BIC	2769.70	2277.16	2485.20	2077.62

Notes: Standard errors (robust clustered by state) in parentheses. * p<0.05.

Table A4: OLS Regression Models for Dependent Variables

	Pct. Women	Pct. Blacks	Pct. Latinos	Pct. Workers
Number of	0.28*	0.01	0.12	0.02
Positions	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Leadership	4.17	-6.04*	4.89	-0.02
Elections	(3.65)	(2.52)	(3.42)	(1.02)
Legislative	9.34	-1.89	-4.56	-1.74
Professionalism	(18.00)	(3.70)	(3.19)	(3.80)
Term Limits	-3.35	2.20	-1.46	-0.29
	(3.38)	(1.25)	(1.17)	(0.97)
Pct. Women in	1.03*			
Legislature	(0.22)			
Pct. Black in		0.73*		
Legislature		(0.20)		
Pct. Latino in			1.31*	
Legislature			(0.15)	
Pct. Worker in				0.54*
Legislature				(0.20)
Democratic	-2.79	0.16	-0.99	-1.17
Control	(2.87)	(1.52)	(0.68)	(1.08)
South	2.22	1.85	-0.26	-1.83
	(3.24)	(2.99)	(0.85)	(0.94)
Term FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-9.74	6.15	-3.75	1.92
	(7.28)	(3.35)	(2.92)	(1.92)
N	324	324	324	324
R^2	0.18	0.46	0.36	0.18

Notes: Standard errors (robust clustered by state) in parentheses. * p<0.05.